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Abstract  
There has been an inequality in payroll among Major League Baseball teams for many years that 
became increasingly evident in the late 1990s. Revenue disparities among teams cause a 
competitive imbalance for the league and make it harder for small-market teams to compete with 
large-market teams with much higher payrolls. MLB has attempted to alleviate this disparity, but 
the implementation of revenue sharing and the competitive balance tax alone is not enough for 
small-market clubs to build a competitive team. There are a number of ways that small-market 
clubs can build a competitive team despite limited resources, including employing the moneyball 
hypothesis, quantifying market inefficiencies, utilizing the team’s farm system, taking advantage 
of trade opportunities, and making intelligent contract decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAYROLL DISPARITY AMONG MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
 
4 
Payroll Disparity Among Major League Baseball Teams: 
Building a Competitive Team Despite Limited Resources 
Introduction 
There has been an inequality in payroll among Major League Baseball teams for many 
years.  Not only is there a disparity in payroll between separate teams, but there is also pay 
variation among players on individual teams.  The inequality in payroll among MLB teams and 
players became increasingly apparent after the era of free agency, the formation of the Major 
League Baseball Players’ Association (MLBPA), the strike of 1994, and the Curt Flood Act of 
1998 (Grow, 2016; Krissoff, 2013).  Studies have shown, as one would expect, that an individual 
team’s payroll has a significant impact on that team’s success (Lu, Matthews, Wang, & Zhuang, 
2018).  In effect, this decreases the chances of small-market teams reaching and succeeding in 
the postseason compared to larger-market teams and, therefore, causes a competitive imbalance 
within the league.  Relatively few fans want to see the same teams win the World Series year 
after year, and no fans want to see their favorite team lose year after year, so MLB implemented 
a revenue sharing program in an attempt to lessen the pay disparity among teams and improve 
the competitive balance. While the plan does not make all teams equal, Rockerbie & Easton 
(2018) found that revenue sharing produces significant utility gains at little cost.  The agreement 
intended to alleviate the growing inequalities found among large- and small-market teams and 
improve the competitive balance within the league.  Despite MLB’s implementation of revenue 
sharing, payroll disparity and competitive imbalance are still present throughout the league.  
While a team’s payroll has a significant impact on their performance relative to other teams, it is 
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not the only contributing factor to a team’s success.  There are a number of ways that small-
market teams can build a competitive team despite their low budget.  
Payroll Inequality Among Teams 
 The payroll inequality among teams has not always been as evident as it is today.  The 
valuation of MLB teams today ranges from $1 billion to $4.6 billion dollars, with twenty-two out 
of thirty teams being valued at less than $2 billion, five teams being valued at $3 billion or more, 
and only one team being valued at more than $4 billion: the New York Yankees at $4.6 billion 
(“The Business of Baseball,” 2020).  Four main occurrences contributed to the rise of player 
salaries and the increasing disparity among team payrolls: the era of free agency, the formation 
of the Major League Baseball Players’ Association (MLBPA), the strike of 1994, and the Curt 
Flood Act of 1998.  Lu et al. (2018) confirmed that when a team pays more to its players, it 
enhances the team’s winning percentage.  Similarly, organizations that compensate their 
employees at higher levels than their competitors should expect to enjoy superior performance 
(Hill, Aime, & Ridge, 2016). Having a higher payroll allows teams to offer star players higher 
salaries, persuading them to sign with them rather than with a small-market team.  
Free Agency 
 The minimum salary for MLB players in 2020 is $555,000 (MLB, n.d.).  This means that 
every MLB player is in the top one percent of American households (Krissoff, 2013).  However, 
this has not always been the case.  It took lengthy and extended labor negotiations and the 
emergence of new revenue sources for players to be able to make what they make today.  In 
1887, professional baseball owners added the reserve clause to contracts restricting their players 
from signing contracts with new teams which limited players’ options to negotiate salaries in an 
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open market (Krissoff, 2013).  This clause made it necessary for players to accept their team’s 
salary offer, or to not play.  It wasn’t until the 1970s that the reserve clause was altered.  In 1972, 
the Supreme Court ruled against Curt Flood in his bid to become a free agent, but in December 
of 1975, a ruling by arbitrator Peter Seitz created the opportunity for players to move from one 
team to another for the first time, and this ruling was subsequently upheld by the courts 
(Krissoff, 2013).  Though Curt Flood lost his bid for free agency at the time, he paved the way 
for players to ultimately be granted free agency by transforming the reserve clause for future 
players to have a say in what team they played for and how much they were paid.  
MLBPA and the Strike of 1994  
 To offset the strength of team ownership, the Major League Baseball Players’ 
Association (MLBPA) was formed in 1954 (Krissoff, 2013). The negotiation of the first 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between owners and the players’ association in 1968 
increased the minimum salary for a Major League player as well as other necessities (Krissoff, 
2013).  Between 1972 and 1995, there were eight strikes and lock outs within the league.  The 
strike during the 1994-95 season lasted 232 days and was quite costly to both owners and 
players.  Following this strike, owners and players alike realized how high the cost of cancelling 
games was and acknowledged the need for negotiation and agreement between them (Krissoff, 
2013).  In 1996, the minimum salary for a player was about $108,000, and the collective 
bargaining agreement negotiated that year increased the minimum salary to $150,000 for 1997.  
Since then, it has more than tripled to $555,000 (MLB, n.d.).  The average salary had also tripled 
between 1987 and 1997, from the $400,000 range to over $1.2 million, and it nearly tripled again 
between 1997 and 2012 to over $3.3 million (Krissoff, 2013). 
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Curt Flood Act 
 Three Supreme Court decisions led to MLB’s exemption from antitrust laws with the 
Court originally upholding in 1922 that professional baseball did not constitute interstate 
commerce (Grow, 2016).  This immunity to antitrust laws meant that players could not file 
lawsuits against the league under antitrust laws.  However, after the 1996 collective bargaining 
agreement was approved, both sides agreed to jointly petition Congress to repeal baseball’s 
antitrust exemption solely for purposes of allowing Major League players to file antitrust suits 
against the league (Grow, 2016).  The Curt Flood Act of 1998 allowed this and, therefore, 
equalized the power between players and owners. Though the Curt Flood Act passed in 1998, it 
started developing in the 1970s when Curt Flood lost his case for free agency.  Shortly after his 
case, in 1975, a ruling by arbitrator Peter Seitz granted Major League players the right to move 
from one team to another for the first time (Krissoff, 2016).  Knowing this ruling would soon be 
granted, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally opted to play the 1975 season without agreeing 
to terms on a new contract with their teams for upcoming years.  After the season, the two 
claimed that the reserve clauses in their 1974 contracts only allowed their teams to claim their 
services for one additional year (the 1975 season) and that they should be granted free agency so 
they may sign with whichever club they choose (Grow, 2016).  MLB attempted to dispute their 
interpretation, but a panel of arbitrators ruled in favor of the players, and they were granted free 
agency for the 1976 season (Grow, 2016).  However, owners tried to take this right away from 
them at every chance they could.  In the 1985, 1986, and 1987 off-seasons, owners collectively 
agreed amongst themselves that they would not bid on each other’s free agents.  The MLBPA 
then filed grievances charging the owners with collusion, and the owners settled these claims by 
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agreeing to pay the affected players $280 million in restitution (Grow, 2016).  Over the next few 
years, owners and the MLBPA continued to disagree and could not come to terms on a new 
collective bargaining agreement before 1993.  This is what triggered the strike of 1994 and 
caused the league to cancel the World Series for the first time in 90 years (Grow, 2016).  The 
two sides finally reached an agreement in November of 1996 which included a provision 
explaining that the Clubs and the MLBPA would work together to pass a law that would cover 
MLB players under the antitrust laws giving them the same rights as other professional athletes 
while the passage of the bill would not affect the antitrust laws in any other way (Grow, 2016).  
This agreement is what eventually resulted in the passage of the Curt Flood Act in 1998.  
Within Team Pay Inequality 
 While payroll inequality among teams seems to be the most evident factor in a team’s 
performance, there have also been studies analyzing the correlation between intra-team payroll 
and the team’s success.  Today, player salaries range from the league minimum of $555,000 up 
to $38.3 million (MLB, n.d.; Langs, 2019). Breunig, Garrett-Rumba, Jardin, & Rocaboy (2013) 
found that there is a negative relationship between wage dispersion and overall team 
performance.  They concluded that increased wage dispersion leads to lower individual effort, 
and consequently, lower team performance (Breunig et al., 2013).  Their findings support the 
theory that a small-market team with lower wage dispersion could perform better than a large-
market team with a high wage dispersion.  
Tao, Chuang, & Lin (2016), tested whether the tournament theory or the cohesiveness 
hypothesis is supported by the relation between salary dispersion and team performance.  The 
tournament theory suggests that employees’ efforts are dictated by the spread between the 
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earnings of each position, and the team-cohesiveness hypothesis suggests that narrow wage 
differentials can improve cohesiveness and productivity in an organization (Tao et al., 2016).  It 
is common knowledge that players at different positions earn different salaries on all teams, so 
the tournament theory would not be expected to have a large impact on team performance.  
However, if players who make the minimum salary per year are performing well while their 
teammates who make millions of dollars per year are underperforming, it is likely that the lower 
paid players become unhappy with their salary.  Tao et al. (2016) concluded that the team-
cohesiveness hypothesis is reasonable.  The findings based on the team performance result 
suggest that the team-cohesiveness hypothesis is supported over the tournament theory, but a 
team’s payroll rank in MLB is still a stronger explanatory variable than a salary dispersion 
variable is (Tao et al., 2016).  Ultimately, the authors found that inter-team payroll disparity 
contributes more to team performance than the structure of intra-team salary dispersion does 
(Tao et al., 2016).  However, small-market teams have little control over inter-team payroll 
disparity while they have full control over the structure of their intra-team salary dispersion.  
Small-market teams cannot simply increase their team payroll to $200 million to compete with 
the Yankees, Dodgers, and Red Sox, but what they can do is minimize the intra-team salary 
dispersion.  Rather than compiling a team of mostly players that earn the minimum salary per 
year and adding one or two all-stars that earn tens of millions of dollars per year, a team that 
focuses on decreasing the range of individual player salaries would expect to perform better than 
teams with high intra-team pay dispersion.  
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Success of Small Market Teams versus Large Market Teams 
 The growing revenue and payroll inequities as well as the competitive imbalance between 
teams became increasingly evident in the mid to late 1990s.  In 1999, Commissioner Allan 
“Bud” Selig assembled the Blue Ribbon Panel to study the effects this inequality had on 
outcomes in MLB games, specifically postseason games (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  The Panel divided 
all teams into four quartiles based on the club’s payroll, with Quartile 1 consisting of the teams 
with the highest payroll and Quartile 4 consisting of the teams with the lowest payroll.  There 
were 158 post-season games played during the 1995-1999 seasons, and no teams from the 
bottom two quartiles won a post-season game during this period (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  
Additionally, every team that won the World Series during each of those five seasons had a 
payroll that fell into Quartile 1 (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  
 Between 2000 and 2019, this trend seemed to continue, though not as extreme.  Many 
more small-market teams made it to the postseason and won games, but the World Series 
champions continued to be teams with high payrolls.  Two out of the last twenty World Series 
champions had the highest payroll in the league as of opening day (the 2000 New York Yankees 
and the 2009 New York Yankees).  Three more champions had the second highest payroll (the 
Boston Red Sox in 2004, 2007 and 2018), and two more had the third highest payroll the year 
they won it all (the 2013 Boston Red Sox and the 2019 Washington Nationals).  Nineteen out of 
these twenty champions had an opening day payroll that ranked in the top 50% of teams for that 
season.  Only one World Series champion between 2000 and 2019 had an opening day payroll in 
the bottom 50% of payrolls: the 2003 Florida Marlins, whose payroll was ranked 25th out of 30 
teams (USA Today, 2020).  
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MLB’s Attempt to Reduce Pay Inequality 
 As the payroll disparity became more and more evident within the league, MLB 
attempted to lessen the disparity in two ways.  The first, and more impactful, is the revenue 
sharing program first implemented in 1996 that redistributes a percentage of local and national 
revenues from large-market teams to small-market teams.  The second is the competitive balance 
tax, more commonly known as the luxury tax, which is similar to a salary cap such that it 
penalizes teams for spending more than a certain amount on payroll for one year.   
Revenue Sharing Program 
The revenue sharing program used in MLB was first instituted in 1996 (Rockerbie & 
Easton, 2018).  Motivations for implementing a revenue sharing plan included supporting small 
market teams, affecting league parity, suppressing player salaries, and improving team 
profitability (Rockerbie & Easton, 2018).  Small market teams struggle to compete with large 
market teams when it comes to signing star players and winning championships.  Revenue 
sharing can also help suppress player salaries, and this is especially useful in MLB because the 
league does not have a hard salary cap for its players or its teams.  
The revenue sharing plan negotiated in the 2003-2006 collective bargaining agreement 
increased the marginal tax rates associated with teams’ revenues from the 1997 collective 
bargaining agreement levels which resulted in rates of 40% for high-revenue teams and 47% for 
low-revenue teams (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  Under the 1997 collective bargaining agreement, the 
rates were 20% and 41% for high and low revenue teams, respectively (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  
Owners and players agreed to these changes because they hoped it would increase competitive 
balance on the field, but the changes did not have the intended effects.  Some teams lowered 
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their payrolls to hold down costs which resulted in lower attendance and revenues and increased 
the funds received through revenue sharing.  Teams also divested their player talent and did not 
compete rigorously in the talent market (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  To remedy this situation, owners 
and players agreed to a marginal tax rate of 31% for all teams in the collective bargaining 
agreement covering the 2007-2011 seasons (Hill & Jolly, 2015).  Jolly (2014) found that after the 
2007 collective bargaining agreement, inequality among teams decreased, on average, indicating 
that changes to revenue sharing should help increase competitive balance within the league.  
Today, the league is under the 2017-2021 collective bargaining agreement which redistributes 
48% of local revenues equally to all 30 MLB teams (MLB, n.d.).  In 2018, each club received 
$118 million from this, and teams also receive a portion of national revenues which were 
estimated to be about $91 million for each team (Baseball Reference, 2020c).  As total revenues 
for MLB continue to grow, it is expected that each club will receive at least $209 million a year 
from revenue sharing alone.  This is a significant amount of money that small-market teams can 
utilize to better their organization.  
Competitive Balance Tax 
 Since the 1996 collective bargaining agreement, MLB has used a progressive competitive 
balance tax (Rockerbie & Easton, 2018).  This tax has become known as the luxury tax.  For first 
time offenders, if a team’s payroll exceeds the payroll threshold set in the most current collective 
bargaining agreement ($206 million for the 2019 season), the team pays a tax rate of 22.5% of 
the payroll overage (MLB, n.d.; Rockerbie & Easton, 2018).  The tax rate increases every time a 
team exceeds the threshold, to 30% for the second time, 40% for the third time, and 50% for four 
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or more offenses.  It is estimated that the New York Yankees paid $304 million in tax over the 
2002-2016 seasons (Rockerbie & Easton, 2018).  
 The competitive balance tax certainly discourages teams from utilizing high payrolls, but 
as seen with the Yankees, it does not prevent it completely.  The tax assists in keeping team 
payrolls within a certain range, but the tax revenue is not redistributed to any MLB teams and, 
therefore, lacks the redistributive component that the revenue sharing program implements.  
Salary Cap and Salary Floor 
 While MLB does not have a salary cap, the competitive balance tax is viewed as a type of 
salary cap by many baseball professionals, owners, and fans.  There are two types of salary caps: 
hard salary caps and soft salary caps.  A hard salary cap prohibits teams from going over that 
salary under any and all circumstances, such as in the NFL. A soft salary cap, which is what the 
NBA has in place, allows teams to go over the set threshold but will penalize them in other ways 
such as fines or a luxury tax.  Even though the competitive balance tax in MLB is not called a 
salary cap, it is very similar to a soft salary cap.  
 Implementing a hard salary cap is one way MLB could lessen the disparity among team 
payrolls.  The salary cap for NFL teams in 2019 was $188.2 million (Shook, 2019).  The luxury 
tax threshold in 2019 was $206 million and will increase to $208 million in 2020 (MLB, n.d.).  It 
is hard to imagine the league implementing a hard salary cap that is below the current luxury tax 
threshold, but even if they set a hard cap at the current luxury tax threshold, it would prevent 
teams from going over the threshold.  However, with the MLB’s historic opposition to having a 
salary cap, and with the soaring revenues that the league is seeing today, the league as well as the 
MLBPA would likely reject implementing one now.  Because of this, an alternative route that the 
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league could choose to go would be to implement a salary floor.  A salary floor would require 
teams to spend a minimum amount on payroll every year.  As discussed earlier, every team 
received over $200 million in 2018 from the revenue sharing redistribution system (Baseball 
Reference, 2020c).  Still, there are teams that have a payroll of far less than these amounts.  
While not all of this can go straight toward player payroll for every team, much of it can.  Team 
payrolls for 2019 ranged from $53.5 million to $211.5 million; a difference of $158 million 
(USA Today, 2020).  Implementing a salary floor of $75 million or even $100 million would 
decrease the payroll disparity and improve competitive balance.  A salary floor, and what it 
should be set at, could be discussed for the next collective bargaining agreement that will need to 
be renewed in 2022.  
Seeing inequality in payrolls within MLB seems to be inevitable today and will most 
likely continue to be a problem for many years to come.  Factors that contributed to growing the 
disparity in the league included the era of free agency, the formation of the MLBPA, the strike of 
1994, and the Curt Flood Act of 1998.  The affect pay inequality had on the competitive balance 
within the league became increasingly evident in the 1990s when no lower payroll team won a 
single postseason matchup during the 1995-1999 seasons, and this competitive imbalance due to 
payroll inequality has still been apparent over the last twenty years and today.  MLB has 
recognized this disparity and has taken steps towards diminishing the payroll inequality and 
competitive imbalance within the league by implementing a revenue sharing program and a 
competitive balance tax threshold.  Though these undertakings have had a positive affect for the 
league as a whole, pay inequality still seems to be the main factor that contributes to the 
competitive imbalance we continue to see in the league.  Small market teams must learn how to 
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utilize the revenue sharing program to their benefit, find ways to increase their revenue on their 
own, and introduce new ways of building a competitive team without the financial resources 
typically necessary.  
Building a Competitive Team Despite a Small Budget 
Lu et al. (2018) confirmed that when a team pays more to its players, it enhances the 
team’s winning percentage.  While a team’s payroll has a significant impact on their 
performance relative to other teams, it is not the only contributing factor to a team’s success.  
There are a number of ways that small-market teams can build a competitive team despite their 
low budget.  These strategies include employing the moneyball hypothesis, quantifying market 
inefficiencies, utilizing the team’s farm system, taking advantage of trade opportunities, and 
making intelligent contract decisions.  Further research will analyze the moneyball approach, 
along with other approaches and theories, in order to determine optimal strategies that small-
market teams can utilize in order to compete in an imbalanced league. 
Moneyball Hypothesis 
 In order for small-market teams to compete with large-market teams, they must use a 
different approach.  Where large-market teams can simply sign big name players to enormous 
contracts, small-market teams have to act differently.  A well-known approach small-market 
teams can take is known as the moneyball approach, which was first articulated by Lewis (2003) 
in his book titled, Moneyball.  The moneyball approach shows how a competitive team can be 
assembled, despite a team’s small budget, by using an analytical, evidence-based, sabermetric 
approach (Lewis, 2003).  Sabermetrics, named after the Society for American Baseball Research 
(SABR), is a way of analyzing baseball statistics in order to evaluate individual player 
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performance.  This approach, first used by Oakland Athletics’ GM Billy Beane and his assistant 
Paul DePodesta led the Oakland Athletics to high winning percentages despite the team’s low 
payroll by analyzing statistics about a player’s walks and on-base average, rather than what 
traditional baseball scouts could see with their own eyes.  Small-market teams can only afford 
one-tool players.  According to the moneyball approach, the most efficient way to spend money 
on baseball players is to spend it on hitters (Lewis, 2003).  Eric Walker (as cited in Lewis, 2003), 
a former aerospace engineer turned baseball writer, wrote that fielding was “at most five percent 
of the game” (Lewis, 2003, p. 58).  The rest was pitching and offense (Lewis, 2003).  At the 
time, good pitchers were usually valued properly while good batters were not. Lewis (2003) cited 
Walker as having stated, “[The] most critical number in all of baseball is 3: the three outs that 
define an inning.  Until the third out, anything is possible; after it, nothing is” (p. 58).  He went 
on to explain that the goal of an offense is to decrease its chances of making an out and that on-
base percentage is an isolated, one-dimensional offensive statistic that measures exactly that: the 
probability that the batter will not make an out and will not put the team closer to the end of the 
inning (Lewis, 2003).  This simple observation was overlooked by almost all general managers 
in MLB at this time.  GM’s also tended to overvalue RBIs, the runs batted in statistic. RBIs were 
treated as an individual achievement.  However, in order to hit runners in, there must be runners 
on base when a player comes to bat.  A player’s ability to hit base runners in and receive credit 
for an RBI, is heavily based on the achievement of others and/or luck.  Bill James, an American 
baseball writer and statistician, explained that the RBI statistic, among other baseball statistics, 
“are not pure accomplishments of men against other men,” but “they are accomplishments of 
men in combination with their circumstances” (Lewis, 2003, p. 71).  General managers in MLB 
PAYROLL DISPARITY AMONG MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
 
17 
during this time overvalued a player’s batting average and RBIs and undervalued a player’s on-
base percentage and slugging percentage.  
 According to Lewis (2003), James also observed that a hitter should be measured by his 
success in creating runs.  James disputed the belief that the purpose of an offense is to compile a 
high batting average by stating that the purpose of an offense is actually to score runs.  He 
explained that the number of runs a player creates cannot be directly measured, but the number 
of runs a team creates can be.  James built a model to predict how many runs a team would score 
given its number of hits, walks, stolen bases, etc.  He achieved this essentially by predicting the 
past.  Using the statistics of the 1975 Red Sox, he determined the relative importance of what 
players did at the plate and on the base paths to the team’s scoring patterns and assigning weights 
to outs, walks, steals, singles, doubles, etc.  The first version of what James called the Runs 
Created formula is as follows: 
 Runs Created = (Hits + Walks)  Total Bases / (At Bats + Walks) 
 The accuracy of this equation revealed that baseball professionals, owners, and general 
managers did not place enough value on walks and extra base hits, which are featured 
prominently in the Runs Created model, and placed too much value on batting average and stolen 
bases, which are not even included in the model (Lewis, 2003).  
The essence of the moneyball hypothesis is that the ability to get on base was 
undervalued in the baseball labor market.  Hakes and Sauer (2006) used linear regression 
analysis to demonstrate that on-base percentage is a powerful indicator of how much a batter 
contributes to winning games.  The results of their analysis confirmed that there is a high 
correlation between runs scored and linear combinations of on-base and slugging percentage.  
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Looking at a team’s on-base percentage and slugging percentage compared to their opponent’s 
on-base percentage and slugging percentage, can explain 88.5% of the variation in winning 
percentage (Hakes & Sauer, 2006).  
Quantifying Market Inefficiencies  
The duo also advocated that an efficient labor market for baseball players would reward 
on-base percentage and slugging percentage in the same proportions that those statistics 
contribute to winning games.  They found that the incremental salary impact for one-standard 
deviation increase for slugging percentage in the first four years (2000-2003) increases from 
$0.52 million to $0.70 million, and they are three to four times as large as the incremental impact 
of a standard deviation increase in on-base percentage which only increases from $0.14 million 
to $0.19 million (Hakes & Sauer, 2006).  However, in 2004, the duo found that the value of one-
standard-deviation increase in on-base percentage increased to $0.49 million likely due to 
Lewis’s publication of Moneyball in 2003 (Hakes & Sauer, 2006).  The authors explained, “The 
lack of a market premium for hitters with superior skill at the patient art of reaching base through 
walks validates the systematic approach taken by the Oakland Athletics in identifying such 
players, and thereby winning games at a discount relative to their competition” (Hakes & Sauer, 
2006, p. 179).  
Though Hakes and Sauer (2016) suggested that market inefficiencies have corrected 
since the publication of Moneyball, Baumer and Zimbalist (2014) refuted that the relationship 
between team payroll and performance has tightened since the publication of Moneyball.  
Baumer and Zimbalist (2014) used official payroll data from the Labor Relations Department 
(LRD) of MLB to determine that while the predictive power of payroll on winning percentage 
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was higher than it was in the 1980s and early 1990s, it was much lower in the 2000s than it was 
in the late 1990s (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2014).  
Farrar and Bruggink (2011) also used the moneyball approach to show that MLB general 
managers do not reward hitters in a manner reflecting the relative importance of on-base 
percentage and slugging percentage.  The two developed a team run production model and a 
player salary model to determine how an increase in on-base percentage and slugging percentage 
increases salary (Farrar & Bruggink, 2011).  They found that a 10 unit increase in team on-base 
percentage brings in an additional 28.5 runs, and a 10 unit increase in team slugging percentage 
results in an additional 17.4 runs (Farrar & Bruggink, 2011).  The player salary model shows that 
the 10 unit increase in individual on-base percentage costs $370,500 while the 10 unit increase in 
individual slugging percentage costs $369,800 (Farrar & Bruggink, 2011).  These results show 
that for approximately the same increase in salary, an increase in on-base percentage brings in 
11.1 more runs than the same increase in slugging percentage (Farrar & Bruggink, 2011).  Even 
years after the publication of Moneyball, on-base percentage continues to be undervalued, and 
slugging percentage is overvalued.  The moneyball hypothesis seems to have been accepted by 
teams, baseball professionals, and fans throughout all of baseball.  However, as these two studies 
reveal, it is not fully implemented and utilized to its full potential.  Today, employing only the 
moneyball hypothesis does not give a team much of an edge over other teams as it did for the 
Oakland Athletics in the late 1990s.  There are many other strategies that small-market teams can 
apply in order to compete with large-market teams with much higher payrolls.  
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Utilizing the Farm System 
 An additional way small-market teams can build a competitive team despite their low 
budget is to utilize the farm system and the annual draft.  Every MLB team has minor league 
team affiliates, typically consisting of at least a Class A team, a Class A-Advanced team, a 
Double-A team, and a Triple-A Team.  Select MLB teams also have Class-A Short Season 
teams. Additionally, every team has at least two rookie teams (many teams have more than two).  
 The MLB First-Year Player Draft is held every year in June and all thirty Major League 
Clubs participate.  The teams take turns selecting players in reverse order of their win-loss 
records at the close of the previous regular season.  In other words, the team with the worst 
record from the previous regular season selects the first player in the draft in the following year.  
Additionally, the order is based off regular season records; the postseason has no effect on the 
draft.  Just because a team wins the World Series, it does not necessarily mean they pick last in 
the draft.  
 When a team drafts a player, that club has full control over the player for at least three 
full seasons.  After these three seasons, a team must decide to place the player on the team’s 40-
man roster, meaning that the player has a major league contract, or the player becomes eligible 
for the Rule 5 Draft1.  Once a player signs a major league contract with a club, he does not 
become eligible for free agency until he has at least six years of service time on a major league 
team.  Specifically, the player must have six years of service time on a major league 25-man 
 
1 The Rule 5 Draft, held every December at the annual Winter Meetings, allows teams without a 
full 40-man roster to select non-40-man roster players from other clubs (Major League Baseball, 
2020b). It is organized similarly to the First-Year Player Draft as clubs draft in reverse order of 
the standings from the previous regular season.  
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roster or disabled list.  Thanks to this, a club can essentially have control over players that they 
draft for the first nine years of their careers, if the club decides to do so.  
Trades  
 As demonstrated by Billy Beane in Moneyball, the key to making trades is playing off 
other teams’ needs and hiding your own team’s desires.  Teams need to know what they want, 
and what they are willing to give up.  The best trades occur when one team is desperate for a 
certain player or desperate to decrease their payroll.  Trades always involve at least two players, 
but often times they include more than two players and sometimes cash.  Though they are less 
common, three-team trades also occur.  One small-market team that successfully utilized trading 
in recent years is the Tampa Bay Rays.  On July 31, 2018, the Rays traded right-handed pitcher 
Chris Archer to the Pittsburgh Pirates for right-handed pitcher Tyler Glasnow, rookie outfielder 
Austin Meadows, and top pitching prospect Shane Baz.  At the time, the Pirates were fighting for 
the division title and decided to make the move before the Trade Deadline.  In retrospect, the 
Pirates ended in fourth in the division, did not make the playoffs, and lost a relief pitcher and two 
incredibly promising young players.  The Rays, however, turned Glasnow into a starting pitcher 
and added a middle-of-the-order bat with Meadows.  Then, in 2019, the Rays placed second in 
the division clinching a spot in the postseason.  The team went on to beat the Oakland Athletics 
in the American League Wild Card game but lost the Division Series to the Houston Astros.  
Making strategic trade decisions during the offseason, throughout the season, and before the July 
31st Trade Deadline can be pivotal for a small-market team.  
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Contract Negotiations  
Contract negotiations are vital for small-market teams.  Contract extensions are the most 
common form of contract negotiations and are the form that small-market teams need to take 
advantage of.  After utilizing your farm system and bringing up young, talented players, teams 
need to seize the opportunity to extend player contracts.  Extending a player’s contract prevents 
the player from reaching the free agent-pool.  Krautmann (2016) finds that the vast majority of 
contract extensions take the player beyond the point of free-agent eligibility.  In free agency, he 
can offer his talent to every major league team and take the highest bid, increasing his salary 
tremendously and becoming too expensive for a small-market club.  If the player enjoyed his 
service time with the team, there is a good chance that he will agree to a contract extension rather 
than enter free agency.  Unlike in some leagues, MLB contracts are guaranteed, meaning that any 
player who signs a major league contract is guaranteed the full amount of money promised by 
those contracts.  Players can sign a contract and never step foot on the field and still receive the 
full amount of their contract.  The main reason for this occurrence is injuries which players and 
teams have little control over. 
 Arbitration.  Along with contract negotiations comes arbitration.  Players become 
eligible for arbitration when they have three or more years of major league service but less than 
six years of major league service and if they do not already have a contract for the next season.  
Arbitration essentially means that if the team and the player cannot agree on a contract, the team 
and the player each present a contract offer to an arbitrator, and the arbitrator chooses one 
without compromising between the two.  This puts both the player and the team at risk, but it is 
much riskier for the team.  The team’s offer is lower than what the player wants, so if a team 
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enters arbitration and loses, they are bound to the higher paying contract.  However, arbitration 
contracts are not guaranteed, as a club can release a player during Spring Training and be 
responsible for only a prorated amount of their arbitration salary (Major League Baseball, 
2020b).  Releasing a player is one option for a team who lost the arbitration hearing and owe the 
player more than they can afford.  On the other hand, a player that has agreed to an arbitration 
salary can break camp with the club and still be guaranteed his full salary (Major League 
Baseball, 2020b).  It would be best for small-market teams to avoid arbitration by negotiating 
with the player and agreeing on a contract without the use of an arbitrator.   
Long-term contracts.  Avoiding long-term contracts is a simple way a team can prevent 
themselves from wasting financial resources in the future.  Signing players to long-term contracts 
is typically attractive to a team because that means they have the security of having that player 
on their roster for years to come.  However, if a player gets injured, he is still entitled to his 
entire contract.  Therefore, a team would essentially be wasting all of the money on that player’s 
contract and gaining nothing in return.  Even further, players do not always perform as well in 
future seasons as they did the season before signing the contract.  Performance is not guaranteed 
over an extended period of time.  Take Chris Davis, for example.  After leading the league in 
home runs and putting up an OPS+ of 1472 in 2015, Davis, who would be entering his age-30 
season in 2016, signed a $161,000,000 seven-year contract.  He has received and will receive a 
base salary of $17 million each year from 2016 to 2022, and the remaining $42 million is 
deferred from 2023 to 2037.  This means that the Baltimore Orioles still owe him $51 million 
 
2 OPS+ normalizes a player’s on-base plus slugging percentage across the entire league. A score 
of 100 is league average, and a score of 150 is 50% better than the league average (Major League 
Baseball, 2020a).  
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over the next three years as well as $42 million when he will not even be playing for them. After 
his impressive 2015 season, his statistics got progressively worse over the next three seasons 
with a slight improvement in the 2019 season.  Even with the slight improvement, he still slashed 
.179/.276/.326 with an OPS+ of 60 (Baseball Reference, 2020a).  
Deferred salaries.  Another way a team can utilize its financial resources to build a 
competitive team despite a small budget is to take advantage of, but also be wary of, deferred 
salaries.  Deferring a player’s salary can sometimes be useful to a team when they have a higher 
team payroll in the current year than what they are expecting in future years.  For example, if a 
team has a highly compensated player that will soon become a free agent but also want to sign 
another player, they can defer the new player’s salary into future years where they will not have 
the obligation to the impending free agent.  Keep in mind that MLB teams must show that player 
salaries that are deferred can be paid off in the next four years, even if the money is contractually 
deferred beyond four years (Brown, Rascher, Nagel, & McEvoy, 2016). On the other hand, often 
times, teams need to be wary of deferred salaries because teams often end up spending much 
more on a player than expected or assumed.  Take Bobby Bonilla for example. Bonilla received 
his deferred salary from a buyout.  Deferred money can come from a buyout or from contract 
negotiations.  In 2000, the Mets opted to pay Bonilla an annuity from 2011 to 2035 rather than 
paying the salary they owed him that year.  The Mets thought that the money they would save by 
not paying Bonilla in 2000 would earn a higher return than the eight percent interest rate offered 
to Bonilla (after considering the time value of money).  Ultimately, Bonilla turned a $5.9 million 
buyout into 25 yearly installments of $1.19 million.   
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 Performance incentive bonuses.  Small-market teams should also consider including 
bonuses in player contracts as incentives.  Bonuses cannot be based on batting or pitching skill or 
where the club finishes in the standings.  However, a bonus can be based on number of days 
spent on an MLB active list, number of games played, number of games started, number of 
games finished, innings pitched for pitchers and/or number of plate appearances for position 
players. Bonuses can also be based on awards such as MVP, Cy Young, Gold Glove, Silver 
Slugger, and/or being named to an all-star team (Phil, 2012).  
History of Successful Small-Market Teams 
 Although it has been challenging and rare for small-market teams to succeed in MLB, 
some clubs have made it happen.  Only one small-market team has won the World Series in the 
last twenty years.  The Florida Marlins had a payroll that ranked 25th out of 30 and did not even 
win their division in the regular season, but ended up winning the World Series in 2003.  Of their 
top twelve players (based on WAR), two were acquired as free agents, two were drafted by the 
club, and eight were acquired by trades (Baseball Reference, 2020b).  
The Pittsburgh Pirates reached the postseason three years in a row from 2013 through 
2015. In 2013, they had the fourth lowest payroll in the league but won the National League 
Wild Card game and advanced to the Division Series.  The club had the fourth lowest payroll 
again in 2014, but they still managed to make it to the Wild Card game again, though they lost to 
the San Francisco Giants who became the World Champions that year.  In 2015, the Pirates had 
the second-best record in the entire league for the regular season and appeared in the Wild Card 
game for a third time.  
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The 2015 Houston Astros and the 2019 Tampa Bay Rays had payrolls ranking 25th and 
30th in the league, respectively, and won the American League Wild Card game but lost the 
Division Series.  The Oakland Athletics made it to the American League Wild Card game in 
2018 as well as 2019 despite having the third lowest payroll in 2018 and the sixth lowest payroll 
in 2019.  The last example from recent years is the 2018 Milwaukee Brewers.  The Brewers’ 
payroll ranked 22nd in the league, but the team won the NL Central Division title, and won the 
Division Series, but lost the Championship Series.   
Conclusion 
 Although some small-market teams are overcoming the inequality, the payroll disparity 
and competitive imbalance among MLB teams is still highly evident today.  There are a number 
of ways that small-market teams can build a competitive team despite their low budget including, 
but not limited to, employing the moneyball hypothesis, quantifying market inefficiencies, 
utilizing the team’s farm system, taking advantage of trade opportunities, and making intelligent 
contract decisions.  Though the moneyball hypothesis is generally known throughout all of 
MLB, large-market teams still tend to ignore its findings.  Small-market teams can continue to 
utilize this theory in order to build their team, but they must also implement other strategies as 
well.  Additionally, MLB should become more aware of the disparity that is still present in the 
league and take steps toward reducing the inequality.   
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